Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba–Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

menacing their lines of communication and rescuing young Ukrainians who were being deported for labor service in Germany. It was during this year that the leaders came to feel the need for closer cooperation and a unification of their efforts. This was hard to achieve and there were even clashes between different groups of Ukrainian patriots. Yet, toward the beginning of 1943 the more important groups had effected a rough union in the U. P. A., the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which took on the characteristics of an organized military force.

By the middle of 1943 this army had acquired considerable strength and it was able to deal shattering blows to isolated German detachments and to drive out both the local German administration and any Red partisans that tried to operate in the area around the Pripet marshes. In May, 1943, they were even strong enough to ambush and kill the head of the Nazi S. A., Viktor Lutze, in the neighborhood of Kowel-Brest Litovsk.

The policy of the U. P. A. was to destroy the local German administrations which were scattered in the smaller communities and to avoid battle with the greater concentration of forces in some of the leading centres. In this way the Ukrainians were able to take over the practical administration of large parts of the Ukraine and to restore a considerable amount of normal life, while they checked the deportation of thousands or released them from the slave trains. The U. P. A. during these years had its own training schools, it set up on a small scale its own factories for arms and some of the most necessary manufactures, and it governed with the approval of the Ukrainian population.

At this period it had its own printing presses and put out a large number of journals and books of various kinds. These were not only in Ukrainian but, as the U. P. A. grew in size and strength, it attracted the attention and won the sympathies of all the other nations oppressed by the Russians. It formed units of Byelorussians, Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, etc. and finally on November 21, 1944, it called the First Conference of the Oppressed Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia, which was attended by some thirty-nine delegates representing thirteen peoples. The Germans

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
●725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

[127] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

In general, the military unification of the armed groups proceeded more rapidly and favorably than did the political concentration. Here the followers of Bandera established in March, 1944, a temporary committee and at a general assembly in June appointed a Supreme Council of Ukrainian Liberation (the UHVR) which assumed the functions of a government. At the same time, through the agreement of the representatives of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, the Ukrainian National Council in Lviv and the National Council of Carpatho-Ukraine, there was formed in September in Kiev the All-Ukrainian National Council (rada) which appointed as its president Prof. Mykola Velychkivsky, the Rector of the Kiev Poytechnic. This was rather under the control of the Melnykivtsy, and was opposed to the UHVR. Yet these differences tended to become academic, in view of the strengthened position of General Taras Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A.

The opposition of the U. P. A. to the German forces was therefore in a sense an opposition behind the lines. It had been facilitated by the German tendency to base their hold on the country through various strong points, while their main forces were advancing to the east and fighting against the Red Army. With the German defeat at Stalingrad in the RSFSR, they began a new retreat and this brought the Soviet forces back into the picture and placed new burdens upon the U. P. A.

In Galicia there had been formed with German toleration a regular Ukrainian division, the Galician Division, on the condition that it would only be employed against the Bolsheviks and would be maintained as a distinct unit. Yet the Germans had no intention of allowing this division to gather strength. They soon replaced the higher officers with Germans and officially called it the 14 Waffen Grenadier Division der Waffen SS., even though in no other case were Slavs of any kind assigned to the SS. This division took part in some battles with the Bolsheviks in the Carpathians. With the breaking of the German front, the German military men made renewed efforts to enroll this division and to create other units in a regular Ukrainian army under General Shandruk but

5: Manning S-4 (no date) 1953 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

The Return of the Communists

The struggle of the U. P. A. against the returning Communists was no less bitter than the struggle with the Nazis but it was under very different conditions and the forces involved were more unequal. In the first place, the bulk of the fighting came after the conclusion of the hostilities of World War II and at a time when the Sovietophilism of the Western democratic powers was at its height. 725 ● 668

The Nazis were during the entire period engaged with the Soviet forces beyond the borders of the Ukraine and while they attempted to maintain their position in the Ukraine, they frequently counted upon their ability to hold the chief road junctions and communities and exerted less effort to keep their garrisons in every separate village. The Soviet policy was to master the entire country and subject every aspect of Ukrainian life to their own power and control. They could therefore the more easily rely upon the use of overwhelming forces and endeavor to maintain a steady and never-ending pressure, while at the same time they could invoke every weapon in their propaganda arsenal to blacken their opponents in the mind of the democratic world.

Then, too, with the ending of formal hostilities there was no longer the possibility that the U. P. A. by its attacks upon one of its enemies could secure the weapons that would serve it in good stead against the other. This had been a marked feature of the earlier campaigns, for the Soviets had reconquered Kharkiv in the late fall of 1942, only to lose it in early 1943 and to recover it again later in the year. The Red Army recovered Kiev on November 6. In the spring of 1944 the Germans were forced to evacuate Lviv but they recovered the city and held it until the end

725 668 of July. Thus, during this period of German retreat, the U. P. A. had been able to acquire large stores of munitions, which they could not hope easily to replace, once the major hostilities were over.

It was very soon evident that the efforts of the U. P. A. against the Soviet forces would take quite a different shape from their attacks on the Nazis. In the last stages of the war Stalin had organized many of the mobilized Ukrainians into various Ukrainian armies, so as to give the Western powers the idea that the Ukrainians were loyal to the Soviet Union. This added elements of a civil war to the struggle and the members of the U. P. A. decided to reduce their efforts against these Ukrainian forces of the Red Army and to substitute propaganda for a free Ukraine. In this respect they met with considerable success and through their masses of printed material and through personal contact, they more or less neutralized the Ukrainian divisions of the Red Army.

[208] [186]

Instead, they concentrated their efforts against the NKVD detachments which were brought in from remote parts of the Soviet Union and in which the Russians formed the predominant personnel. It was the NKVD and the staffs of the Motor Tractor Stations who were now the chief part of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus in the country and so the U. P. A. devoted its chief interest to working against these and to encouraging discontent on the collective farms, for the war was scarcely over when it was made clear that conditions were to be even stiffer and harder than they had been in the past.

The war in the Ukraine had reduced the population to still worse depths of poverty than had been the case after 1918. Nevertheless, almost at once the villages were expected to make liberal gifts of grain to their beloved Stalin and the elder brothers, the Great Russians, who had, in the words of Stalin, won the victory over the Nazis and who would still protect them from the capitalists and warmongers of the West.

[651]

728 648 The events of the last months of fighting had shifted many of the organized forces of the U. P. A. to the Carpathian areas and this section which had struggled for its freedom against Hungary

661 Minister of War, to endeavor to suppress these bands. Despite
668 unprecedented torture of the population, the Soviets found that
725 their progress was not so great as they had expected, for few of the Ukrainian units in their forces were enthusiastic about the campaign, when they saw the measures that the government was taking against their own families.

In the spring of 1946, they made another attempt, this time using some fifteen divisions of NKVD troops from the Far East, Siberia and Leningrad under the direct control of General Colonel Moskalenko. The authorities had been goaded to this renewed demonstration of force by the fact that the town of Stanislav in the Carpathian area had been seized by five battalions of the U. P. A. on October 31, 1945 as a discouragement to the Ukrainians to participate in the Soviet elections called for February 10, 1946. Despite the efforts of the Soviet guards, a considerable portion of the population failed to vote and when the attacks upon them were pressed, a detachment of the U. P. A. succeeded on May 3, 1946, in ambushing Moskalenko and killing him and his chief aids. This ended another campaign and still left the U. P. A. in control of parts of the Carpathian area.

668 In addition to these operations on purely Ukrainian territory,
725 the U. P. A. undertook several raids across the borders in order to encourage dissatisfaction with Soviet rule among some of the neighboring peoples. Thus they established contact with similar groups in Slovakia, Byelorussia and Lithuania, while others cut their way across Hungary into Yugoslavia to join forces with the opponents of Communism in that area.

The raids into Slovakia were especially successful throughout 1945 and 1946 and were continued on a smaller scale during the next years. They served as an encouragement for the anti-Communist elements of the population and, of far more importance in the long run, they attracted the attention of Western journalists who for the first time began to realize the extent of the discontent that prevailed in the Soviet Union. More than that, with every step to the West, they were brought closer to the Western Zones of Germany and Austria and several well-armed detachments have

during the past years fought their way into the American Zone, laid down their arms and surrendered. These brought the first really definite information to the West and while they have not received the attention that they deserved, they have undoubtedly encouraged the almost frantic desires of the Great Russian emigrés to pretend that they have an efficient underground operating at home.

The result of these raids produced an impression even upon the Czechs. Before the Communist coup d'état which placed the Communists in control of that country, the Czech Minister of War under Dr. Benes was approached by the Soviet authorities and asked for joint action with the Soviets and the Communist Poles to check the opposition to Soviet rule and to project joint operations on a large scale.

On March 29, 1947, General W. Swierszczewski, the Communist Polish Vice Minister of War, was killed near the town of Baligrod. This again was too startling a revelation of the discontent and on May 12th of the same year, the three governments of the USSR, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia concluded a treaty of mutual assistance against this movement.

Faced by the increasingly organized power of the Communist regimes, the U. P. A. has been obliged to proceed with more caution and it has largely replaced mass movements with operations on a smaller scale with the idea of keeping alive a spirit of resistance within the country. It is becoming increasingly difficult for it to publish and circulate pamphlets but it is still able, in case of necessity, to impede seriously the Soviet attempts at deportation of the Ukrainian population and again and again it is able to damage severely the Motor Tractor Stations.

On March 5, 1950, General Chuprynka, the commander of the U. P. A., was tracked down and killed in the village of Bilohorska in the very neighborhood of Lviv. He had proved himself a more than competent leader and had been the soul of the U. P. A. since its foundation in 1943. His parents, his wife and his children had all perished in the struggle but he had never wavered in his belief in a final victory and he had become an almost legendary figure.

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●735 His death did not end the fighting, for he was succeeded in command by Colonel Vasyl Koval. Even operations were not suspended, for it is known that late in September of the same year, a detachment of the forces seized the town of Mukachiv in the Carpathians and retired to the mountains with the records of the MVD office there and two prisoners who had made themselves particularly obnoxious by their cruelty and their abuse of the local population.

Thus under the present circumstances the primary task of the U. P. A. is to maintain itself in being as an armed underground, to encourage the population, both of the Ukraine and the other groups oppressed by the Russian Communists, and to carry on certain types of propaganda and of terroristic work which will serve to keep on the anxious seat the masters of the Kremlin. At the moment it does not have the possibility of undertaking by itself those extensive operations that it has done in the past but it is not idle and in the well-hidden bunkers and the forests, it is fostering those traditions which can be again galvanized into activity, if the moment for action arrives.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

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IV. THE OPENING OF THE UKRAINE

LONG BEFORE the Western world guessed his intentions Hitler had begun preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union. As early as 1940 the Germans surreptitiously formed military training units for Ukrainians. Their enlistment was concealed by official statements that the units were for *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans) only, and the purpose of the units was disguised by designating the Reichsarbeitdienst (Reich Labor Service) to be the supervising agency in the Generalgouvernement. Under this camouflage large numbers of Ukrainians were trained for police duty. More advanced training was carried out in Germany under direction of the Wehrmacht. In a number of camps instructors for future Ukrainian police units and interpreters for liaison with the German army were prepared.[1] At first, the chief Ukrainian organizer of this work was Colonel Sushko, and the training units were under the influence of the Mel'nyk group. After the split had fully developed, however, Bandera elements secured the upper hand in many of the groups, which were predominantly composed of young men fitted for active field service.[2]

Either because they were naturally interested in employing the young and physically qualified Ukrainians in the Bandera party for the forthcoming campaign, or because they were dissatisfied with the previous efforts of the OUN-M (Mel'nyk group) to pursue a somewhat independent course, the Germans turned more and more to the insurgent faction. This was especially the case when, in the early spring of 1941, the comparatively unconcealed development of Ukrainian units was begun by the Wehrmacht.

[1] Stepan (Stephen) Huliak, "Polk im. Kholodnoho Iaru v Rivnomu" (The Kholodnyi Iar Regiment in Rovno), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (August-September, 1952), p. 7.

[2] MS D.

The first such unit was known by the code name "Nachtigall" and was organized in the Generalgouvernement. Nominally, only its enlisted personnel were Ukrainian, while all officers were German. Actually, as the Germans well knew, there was a whole staff of "unofficial" Ukrainian officers, headed by the leader of the "military tendency" in the OUN-B, Roman Shukevych. At first "Nachtigall" had only about one hundred and fifty men, but at the outbreak of war it was expanded to battalion strength.[8]

A second unit, larger but of less political significance, was formed in Austria. Ukrainians were allowed a greater degree of formal authority than in "Nachtigall." In *de facto* command was Colónel Iarii, the dissident member of the old Provid, who was at once highly esteemed by his young subordinates and on the closest personal terms with the Abwehr officers charged with the formation of the units. John Gavrusevych, one of the top leaders of the Bandera group, was in charge of recruitment; his source of manpower lay in the large Ukrainian colony in Austria. Up to 1940, the chief Ukrainian organization in the latter territory was the student Sich in Vienna, which was dominated by the OUN. This association continued loyal to Mel'nyk, but most of the numerous Ukrainian factory workers turned to the new movement. It was among the latter that Gavrusevych secured the majority of his recruits, although about one quarter were secured from among the students, particularly those in the medical school in Graz. Care was taken to keep the force—which was called by the organizers Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists)—in the hands of the Bandera group, although only half of the members actually belonged to the new party. Unlike "Nachtigall," which was clad in Wehrmacht *feldgrau*, "Roland," as the military unit composed of the Druzhyny was called, wore uniforms similar to those of the Galician section of the Ukrainian army of revolutionary days.[4]

As is apparent from the above description, the Wehrmacht units were prepared on a rather *ad hoc* basis, with the active

[8] Nykon Nalyvaiko, "Legiony v natsional'nykh viinakh" (Legions in National Wars), *Narod'na Volia* (October 27, 1949), p. 2.

[4] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv l. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 4; MS A.

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

PENETRATION OF NATIONALIST GROUPS INTO THE EAST UKRAINE

SUMMER AND AUTUMN, 1941

Routes of principal groups:

- ---- OUN-B(andera) task forces (*pokhidny hrupy*)
- -·-·- Wehrmacht auxiliary units under influence of OUN-B(andera) ("Roland" and "Nachtigall")
- ——— OUN-M(el'nyk) groups
- ..... Bukovinian groups adhering to the OUN-M(el'nyk)

The boundaries shown are those of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine.

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668* northern task force reached Zhitomir, where it helped a group of local people set up a very impermanent administration, and aroused an equally transitory wave of enthusiasm among some of the younger citizens.[33] The southern force covered an even greater distance; it traveled across Galicia during July, carrying on propaganda work; reached Vinnitsa by the end of the month; and on September 2 was in Dniepropetrovsk (Katerynoslav or, more romantically, Sicheslav), five hundred miles from its starting point.[34]

668* 704 725 Less picturesque, but of potentially greater value, were the military units under control of the Bandera group. As was previously noted, "Nachtigall" had taken part in the occupation of L'vov, where its leaders were of great value in organizing the city for the Bandera party. Although the Wehrmacht officers accompanying the group were aware of the roles of Father Hryn'okh, Shukevych, and Lopatyns'kyi in the *akt*, they protected them from the arrest.[35] The unit continued eastward with the Wehrmacht, in late August reaching Vinnitsa where its members made secret contact with the southern task force.[36]

"Roland," on the other hand, had no direct connection with the activities in Galicia. Before the outbreak of war, it was sent across Hungary to the Rumanian part of Bukovina. There were considerable difficulties with the Rumanians because of efforts of the Ukrainian nationalists to establish contact with local Ukrainians who were Rumanian subjects. After the outbreak of war, however, the unit was sent with the German advance through Bessarabia, across the Dniester, and into the Ukrainian ethnographical territory north of Tiraspol' where it remained until early September.[37]

668* While the newest Ukrainian nationalist party was achieving widespread, though transitory successes, its chief rival was not idle. The defection of the bulk of the Galician youth had indeed dealt a heavy blow to the "legitimate" OUN under Mel'nyk. Nevertheless, it retained several very important assets. In the first place,

[33] Ievhen Stakhiv, p. 39.
[34] Matla, p. 9.
[35] Interview 63.
[36] *Ibid.*; Matla, pp. 9–10.
[37] Ortyns'kyi, p. 4; MS A.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The northern part, appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoiding the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12–14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

725 665 669 October, but a group of similar size and composition in the Novo Moskovsk-Pavlograd (Novomoskovs'k-Pavlohrad) forest east of Dniepropetrovsk was able to hold out until January, 1942.[4]

While the partisan bands in isolated shelters in the southern steppe Ukraine could not survive the first determined German attacks, those in Polessia were more fortunate. The chief areas of operation were the northern sections of the Chernigov and the Sumy *oblasts*. In the Chernigov *oblast* the partisans were led by the first secretary of the *oblast* committee of the Party, Oleksii Fedorov, a veteran of the revolutionary period. Though a hardened Communist, Fedorov had been born in the Dniepropetrovsk area and considered himself a Ukrainian.[5] He, like many other Party leaders, was temporarily swept from his territory by the rapidity of the German advance but returned in the late summer of 1941 and gathered the scattered remnants of his Party apparatus for a struggle against the Germans.[6] In the Sumy *oblast* the underground Party machinery was completely disrupted, but some of the *raion* officials succeeded in forming small partisan groups.[7]

It is clear from the preceding summary that the initial organization of the Red partisans of the Ukraine was carried out by members of the Communist Party and the Soviet state apparatus. These men were impelled both by their interest in maintaining the *status quo* and by the fear of violent death should they fall into German hands, since all "kommissars" and Communist officials were destined for execution by Hitler. Since the war, Soviet authors have admitted, and even exaggerated the role of the Party in the partisan movement, apparently because they wish to emphasize its "guiding role" in all spheres of Soviet life.[8] During the war, however, and especially in its early stages, while some attention was given to the activity of the Communist Party, an

[4] War Diary No. 2 of 213. Sicherungsdivision, Abteilung Ia, January 1–March 31, 1942, NOKW 2872 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2872); Report of Feldpolizeidirektor to Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets 103, January 9, 1942, NOKW 2911 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2911).

[5] Fedorov, p. 31.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

[7] Sidor Kovpak, *Vid Putivlia do Karpat* (From Putivl' to the Carpathians), literary ed. Ie. Herasimov (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 5 ff.

[8] E.g., in Fedorov's work cited earlier in this chapter.

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PARTISAN ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN UKRAINE

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The following set of maps is intended to present schematically the development of partisan activity in the northern Ukraine from the beginning of the German-Soviet war until the reconquest of the major part of the area by the Red Army at the end of 1943. Territorial divisions indicated, from west to east, are the *General-bezirke* Volhynia-Podolia, Zhitomir, and Kiev, and the Chernigov *oblast* of the army rear area.

The following symbols are used throughout:

- Major centers of Red Partisan groups
- Area in which Red partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control
- Direction of major drives of Red partisans
- Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Borovets' or Mel'nyk
- Major centers of Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups adhering to Bandera
- Area in which nationalist partisan activity was so extensive as to constitute a disruption of German control
- Direction of major drives of nationalist partisans
- Direction of major German counterdrives

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JULY, 1941–JUNE, 1942

This map represents a number of developments which were not closely related. The nationalist Ukrainian partisan groups represented were irregular forces in the German service used to combat Red partisans, rather than insurgent partisan forces, and the area represented as controlled by them is the area in which the Germans did not install a civil administration prior to November, 1941 (the "Olevsk Republic").

(Polis)_1 The Polis'ka Sich after it went underground in November, 1941

(Polis)_2 Ukrainian nationalist police (Polis'ka Sich) headquarters, prior to November, 1941

(Red)_1 Major centers of Red partisans in winter and spring of 1942

(Red)_2 Chief recruiting area for Kovpak's Red partisan force in summer, 1942

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JULY-DECEMBER, 1942



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JANUARY–MAY, 1943

- Major centers of Bandera groups during the winter and early spring of 1943
- Extension of Bandera partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Major centers of "Bul'ba" and Mel'nyk groups throughout the period
- Major centers of Red partisan activity in winter and early spring of 1943
- Additional centers of Red partisan activity in April and May, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Red partisan band (Actually the band began its raid in November, 1942, being driven beyond the northern border of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in December, as shown on the map, but for the sake of simplicity all of the band's activities during this first period of its invasion of the "Right Bank" Ukraine have been shown on this map.)

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JUNE–DECEMBER, 1943



- Major centers of Bandera partisan activity, May–July, 1943
- New headquarters of Bandera group in late summer and autumn, 1943
- Major Mel'nyk and "Bul'ba" bands, May–July, 1943
- Last stronghold of "Bul'ba" group before its dissolution
- Chief points of contact of Red partisan groups with nationalist groups, May–July, 1943
- Route of Kovpak's Carpathian raid
- Major areas of Kovpak's activity in Galicia, July, 1943
- Area to which remnants of Kovpak's band returned in September, 1943
- Approximate lines of combat between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, with the Roman numerals referring to dates as follows:
  - I October 1, 1943
  - II November 12, 1943
  - III December 10, 1943
  - IV February 15, 1944

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effort was made to give the impression that the partisans represented a spontaneous popular uprising against the foreign invader; the "common man" of the occupied areas of the Soviet Union was pictured as a patriot voluntarily assisting the Red Army to overthrow German rule.[9]

It is this aspect of the Soviet partisan movement which makes it of particular interest to this study. The partisans in the Ukraine were pictured as motivated by local patriotism, while their leaders were described as successors of Khmelnits'kyi and other legendary heroes. The primary effort in this direction centered about the person of Sidor Kovpak, who became the chieftain of the partisans of the Sumy *oblast*. Kovpak claimed to be a descendant of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. While his enemies declared he was a gypsy—the disarray of his bivouac led even admirers to compare it to a gypsy camp—it appears likely that he was of native Ukrainian origin. He was an old Communist, a veteran of the civil war of 1918–20, but was quite uneducated, and had occupied only minor posts in the Soviet hierarchy. Apparently, however, his rough and earthy manner endeared him to considerable elements of the Ukrainian population, while his evident skill in conducting his partisan operations won him respect.[10]

Kovpak's personal qualities and the fact that his band was formed on Ukrainian soil, made it possible for Soviet propagandists to give some color to their assertion that his partisan organization was a manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism. Closer examination of the groups operating in the northeastern *oblasts* casts considerable doubt on this contention. In the first place, whatever the origins of its members, Kovpak's band was almost certainly formed initially, as were the other partisan groups in 1941, of members of the ruling machine. The commissar Rudnev, said to be the real "brains" of Kovpak's band, for example, was

[9] See, for example, Timofei (Timothy) Strokach, *Partyzany Ukraïny* (The Partisans of the Ukraine) (Moscow: Ukrvydav Ts. K. KP[b]U, 1943). The title sheet of this work describes Strokach as a "deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR."

[10] On Kovpak cf. his memoir previously cited; P. Vershigora, *Liudi s chistoi sovest'iu* (People with Clean Consciences) (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1951), pp. 39, 49, 181, 412; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3 (for the nature of this source see n. 15 below); V. Andreev, *Narodnaia voina: Zapiski partizana* (The People's War: Sketches of a Partisan) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 228.

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a professional army political officer, who had been engaged in Party work in the Sumy *oblast*.[11] Moreover, it is at least a peculiar coincidence that its nucleus was formed in the Putivl' *raion* which, with parts of the neighboring districts, forms the only enclave of Russian-speaking peasantry in the northern Ukraine.[12]

Although Party and governmental functionaries formed the original nucleus of the partisan movement, they were soon joined by large numbers of Red Army soldiers who had been cut off from the main body of Soviet troops by the German advance. Such soldiers were, of course, drawn from all parts of the USSR, and were not specifically Ukrainian. Moreover, those soldiers who, in the first stages of the war, cared to take the desperate course of joining partisans were frequently adherents of the regime, led by officers of the political section of the army (commissars and *politruks*) or by NKVD men. Such, for example, was Alexander Saburov, who was to be exceeded in fame only by Kovpak among the partisans in the Ukraine. Saburov had, to be sure, been an NKVD official in Kiev at the outbreak of the war, but he was a native of the Ural region.[13]

Soviet sources are much more reticent concerning the nature of the group directing the Red partisans from outside the occupied areas. Nikita Krushchev (then first secretary of the Party in the Ukraine, although born in the Kursk *oblast*, probably of Russian origin) is said to have played a major part, while Demian Korotchenko, a Ukrainian (then second secretary) even visited the partisan bands on German-occupied soil.[14] The chief direction of the movement was, however, in the hands of the Ukrainian Staff of the Partisan Movement. Little can be gathered from Soviet sources concerning this body. It is known, however, that

[11] Vershigora, p. 39.

[12] Putivl' is the only town in the Ukraine, with the exception of the Donbas and Kiev, in which the Germans allowed the publication of a Russian-language newspaper. Since the Wehrmacht made a practice of maintaining newspapers in other Ukrainian areas where there was a danger of disaffection (e.g., in Polessia in the autumn of 1941), it appears that they felt the need for propaganda to *Russians* in the Putivl' area.

[13] Anatolii Shyian, *Partyzans'kyi Krai* (Partisan Territory) (Kiev: Ukraïns'ke Derzhavne Vydavnytsvo, 1946), pp. 19, 32.

[14] Fedorov, p. 475; Vershigora, p. 397. A prewar source (Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III [Spring, 1939], 39) maintains that Korotchenko was a Russian whose real name was Korotchenkov.

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its chief was Timothy A. Strokach, a high-ranking veteran of years of service in the NKVD frontier troops. In 1943, Strokach's adjutant, Alexander Ruzanov, was captured by the Germans, and according to articles published in the press of the occupied territories, described the channels through which the NKVD controlled the partisan movement.[15] While such a propaganda story must be viewed with considerable suspicion, the numerous details of the account attributed to Ruzanov lend it plausibility, and many can be checked against independent evidence. For example, he is said to have revealed that M. S. Spivak, "a typical civilian Chekist," was second in command of the partisan movement. This seems plausible, since Spivak's post as secretary for cadres of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was closely associated with NKVD work, and Spivak is described by a recent Soviet partisan memoir as one of a group of leading officials who greeted the Ukrainian partisan leaders when they arrived in Moscow in late 1942.[16]

While the above evidence concerning the composition of the central directing body of the partisans of the Ukraine is not entirely conclusive, taken together with other evidence from Soviet memoirs and German documents concerning the role of NKVD officers in the partisan movement,[17] it suggests very strongly that the NKVD played a major role in the development of the Red partisans. This suggestion supports the view previously expressed that the partisan movement was an artificial creation of the Soviet regime and that its leaders were tested adherents of the regime, drawn from all the geographic regions and ethnic areas of the Ukraine. It appears safe to conclude that the formation of the Red partisan movement offers no proof of a "rallying" of Ukrainian patriots to the side of the Soviet system.

[15] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 23, 1943, p. 3, contains one of these articles, which states that it is based on accounts in *Ukraïns'kyi Dobrovolets'* and *Nova Doba*. A German-language version was published in *Der Deutsche in Transnistrien*, November 28, 1943, p. 2. Strokach was a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and is said (by Ruzanov) to have been deputy People's Commissar of the Interior of the Ukraine. After the war Strokach became Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Ukraine, and later (1953) Minister.

[16] Fedorov, p. 474.

[17] Cf. NOKW 1519.

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This does not, however, imply that in its later stages, after it had been organized and developed by the Party cadres, the partisan movement was unable to obtain some support among the Ukrainian people. The partisans were frequently much weaker than the total forces which the Germans could employ against them; consequently, it was essential that they secure the aid of local men for scouting, concealment, and sabotage of German offensives. While some of their arms and ammunition, as well as medical supplies, could be flown in, they had to rely on the inhabitants of the area in which they operated for food and for replacements for men lost in action. Moreover, a primary function of the units was political as well as military: they were intended to maintain a vestige of Soviet authority in areas far away from the direct control of the rulers in the Kremlin.

In order to secure local support both compulsion and persuasion were employed. Compulsion was used to requisition food and equipment needed, to draft men into the guerrilla units, and to inhibit collaboration with the Germans. Methods employed frequently included killing the families of those who entered the German police or administrative organs, as well as the collaborators themselves.[18] The mere fact that the partisans could move about in force induced the cautious peasants to believe that Soviet victory was possible and that, consequently, it would be dangerous to side with the regime's enemies. Persuasion, however, would probably have been ineffective had it not been for the atrocities practiced by the Germans, especially the *Ostarbeiter* agencies, which led thousands of persons, mostly young and fit for partisan service, to flee to the woods.[19] The German failure to carry out the land reform, by depriving the peasants of a motive for resisting the return of the Soviet forces, was also a major cause of partisan success. The partisans made strong efforts to win over the peasants, in some cases even paying for requisitioned food supplies. According to a German report, one Red

[18] Report of Gebietskommissar Steudel in Kazatin, November 8–December 28, 1943, PS 1702 (hereafter referred to as PS 1702); PS 3943, February 12, 1943.

[19] Those who obeyed the order to report for the *Ostarbeiter* program were threatened by the partisans, while the order itself often served as a pass to join a partisan unit (Occ E-4 [1]).

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partisan band even distributed land to the peasants in the area it controlled.[20]

The early development and continued strength of the Red partisans, arising in part from reinforcements sent them from the chief power base of the Soviets in the unconquered areas, enabled them to dominate the only regions suitable for guerrilla warfare east of the Dnieper. Therefore the nationalists could not have established partisan forces there unless they had possessed overwhelming popular support.[21] The possibility of such support was decreased by the fact that many elements opposed to the Germans were drawn into the Communist underground and partisan units before the nationalists could develop their organizations. Moreover, the nationalist groups were too small, too harried by the Germans, and too remote from their base in Galicia to constitute cadres for a large-scale partisan movement. It took months of struggle to maintain a bare existence underground and to find a program which appealed to the masses before the nationalists were ready for activity of any importance. By then the Germans were in full retreat; guerrilla warfare against them would have had little value.[22]

Volhynia, close to the main base in Galicia, and more penetrated by nationalist ideology, offered a more favorable field for Ukrainian nationalist partisan groups. The people of Volhynia suffered almost as much as did those in the German-occupied East Ukraine. However, the Bandera organizers, who were predominantly Galician, needed much preparation to acquire real strength in the area. Consequently, for more than

[19] PS 1685; PS 051.

[20] There are unsubstantiated accounts of a few small groups. See, for example, the description of a band supposed to have been wiped out by Red partisans in the Chernigov region in early 1943, in "Persha Ukraïns'ka Partyzanka" (The First Ukrainian Partisan Group), *Vpered* (January, 1950), pp. 13–14.

[21] Most of these deficiencies were not present in Galicia. To the majority of the people of Galicia, however, the release from Soviet tyranny was so welcome that the thought of conflict with the "liberators" appeared ridiculous; see Mykola (Nicholas) Lebed', *UPA: Ukraïns'ka Povstans'ka Armiia* (UPA: The Ukrainian Insurrectionary Army) (Presove Biuro UHVR, 1946), p. 17, which hints at this lack of support. Moreover, the tranquility of the area and the comparative freedom of movement of nationalist elements made Galicia a valuable base of organization and recruitment for the nationalist forces, which they long hesitated to disturb by violent action.

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a year they confined themselves to surreptitious propaganda, penetration of the police units, and preparation of secret arms caches.[23] What the Bandera organization was unwilling to risk, in spite of the large number of its youthful adherents and the proximity of its Galician base, the Mel'nyk faction obviously could not attempt, even when its break with the Germans might have made resistance desirable. Consequently, the only Ukrainian nationalist organization which could remotely be described as a partisan group during the first year of the Reichskommissariat's administration of Volhynia was the Polis'ka Sich (Polessian stronghold) under Borovets'.

It is extremely difficult to ascertain just what activities the UPA carried out during 1942. That it fought sporadically with small groups of Red partisans in the winter and spring appears certain.[24] It is also certain that it existed illegally, in defiance of a German order for its dissolution,[25] and that it gathered arms surreptitiously, and it is reasonably sure that some of its members from time to time had armed encounters with German security forces. It is, however, by no means certain that the group carried out open attacks against the Germans, or that the latter were entirely dissatisfied with the state of affairs in which the illegal band kept a region of difficult terrain and low economic potential from serving as a Red base behind the German lines. Moreover, as Borovets' himself has pointed out, it was never the intention of his movement to engage in a large-scale military campaign, but rather to retain a small staff which could draw support and recruits from the sympathetic Polessian peasantry.[26]

That the group was of some importance within these limits is indicated by the fact that in the late summer of 1942 the Soviet partisans in Polessia felt it worth while to send an emissary, Alexander Lukin, to negotiate for common action against the Germans.[27] The mere fact, however, that such negotiations could be

[23] PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

[24] At least all its critics, as well as its adherents, agree on this point.

[25] PS 3943, May 22, 1942.

[26] Taras Borovets', *Zboroina boroť ba Ukraïny (1917–1950)* (The Armed Struggle of the Ukraine [1917–50]), 1951, pp. 10–11.

[27] Dmitrii Medvedev, *Sil'nye dukhom* (The Strong in Spirit) (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Soiuza SSSR, 1951), p. 83; Taras Borovets', "Dva Khresty" (Two Crosses), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, Christmas issue, January 7, 1949.

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725 668* undertaken is an indication of the uncertainty of the ideology and objectives of the little group. "Bul'ba" Borovets' himself, a man of little schooling, apparently was not sure what direction the movement should take, although he had a deep-rooted love for his native country. He continued to maintain ties with the UNR; there were UNR officers with the group much of the time, advising on military matters on which few of the younger members had had experience. Borovets' kept up a precarious line of communication with Andrew Livyts'kyi himself through an old UNR member, Captain Raievs'kyi, who ostensibly carried on the functions of *raionchef* in the Rovno district.[28]

665 668* 727 These connections were too discontinuous to provide much guidance, however, even if the enfeebled Warsaw headquarters had had a clear line to offer. At the same time, the group under Borovets' was acting as a refuge for extremely diverse elements seeking an escape from German suppression. As was previously described, Borovets' had made an agreement with the OUN-M by which he was to be sent a number of officers. Apparently this help was slow in arriving. By summer, 1942, however, a few men had appeared; one was the Zhitomir journalist Anthony Baranivs'kyi, who became the Mel'nyk representative at the headquarters of Borovets'.[29] He, of course, adhered to the OUN-M line. A quite different group consisted of the former "left wing" of the Bandera party. Its leaders, Mitrynga, Turchmanovych, Ryvak, and Boris Levits'kyi, were with the task forces destined to proclaim the *akt* in Kiev. When these groups were broken up by the Germans before reaching their goal, the young men escaped arrest but were forced to go into hiding. Then, since the whole tendency of the OUN-B indicated to them that they could no longer hope to secure the adoption of their left-wing program, all except Levits'kyi (who went into hiding in Galicia) fled to Volhynia, where they found a protector in the Polis'ka Sich.[30] There, apparently, they attracted to their ideology a young as-

[28] Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, December 28, 1950, p. 2.

[29] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 1, 1951, p. 4; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 92.

[30] Interview 43.

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sistant of Borovets', Leonidas Shcherbatiuk, son of one of the generals of the Republican army. With his support they founded in the midst of the untutored woodland peasants yet another Ukrainian party. Known as the Ukrainian Popular Democratic Party (*Ukraïns'ka Narodna Demokratychna Partiia*—UNDP), it advocated a program centering on maintenance of ownership of industry, means of transportation, and other large-scale enterprises by the state, with operation in the hands of the workers. At the same time, it condemned authoritarian control and violation of the rights of individuals.[31]

It was this motley group which carried on negotiations with the Soviet partisan Lukin in the autumn of 1942. While differing in details, the Soviet and the nationalist accounts of these discussions agree that the Red emissary demanded formal submission of the nationalist band to Soviet control, while Borovets' and his advisers were united in insisting on limiting an agreement to cooperation against the Germans.[32] Moreover, the Soviet sources frankly admit that the Red partisans were very weak in Volhynia at this time. They were confined almost entirely to the extreme nothern part of the region, where they received support from the powerful Soviet bands in Belorussia. There was one band near Kovel', but it was under the command of a Pole, and apparently was composed of Poles rather than Ukrainians.[33] It is therefore quite understandable that the Soviet leadership may have wished to gain the support of the group under Borovets' until more "reliable" Soviet forces could be formed in Volhynia. It is significant that one of the alleged Communist demands was for an open campaign against the Germans, including particularly the assassination of the Reichskommissar. It is likely that the reason Borovets' gives for rejection of these demands is accurate, for it is in line with the whole tactical policy of his move-

[31] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 2, maintains that the "proclamation" of the UNDP was made in June, 1943; other sources set the *founding* of the party in 1942, however, and it is certain that the group had a developed ideology before 1943; see Borys Levits'kyi, "Istorychne znachennia rozlamu v OUN" (The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN), *Vpered*, No. 2 (11) (1950), p. 6.

[32] Medvedev, pp. 83–86; Borovets', "Dva khresty".

[33] G. Lin'kov, *Voina v tylu vraga* (The War in the Rear of the Inemy) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1951) p. 384.

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668* 725 ment. He maintains that such action at that time would have been suicidal for the group and that it would have brought extreme suffering on the Volhynian people.[34]

When Borovets' could protract the negotiations no longer, Lukin flew back to Moscow; then the Red partisans began to move against the band they had hoped to use as an ally. In the late summer of 1942 the number of Soviet partisans sent in by air to northern Volhynia, or crossing the Pripet swamps from Belorussia, increased to the point where they became a real threat both to the nationalist group and to the German administration. By autumn the entire forest area west of the Dnieper was within their field of operation.

The unrest was soon increased by the arrival of the arch-guerrilla, Kovpak. In August he had flown from his Briansk hide-out to Moscow, to confer (by his own account) with Stalin himself. The Soviet dictator asked him—according to his memoirs and those of other Red partisans—whether it would be possible to make a raid in force on the "Right Bank" region, west of the Dnieper. Apparently the small, scattered partisan forces there were not contributing enough to the Soviet war effort; moreover, Stalin felt the need of convincing his former subjects of the reality of Red power by sending in a force of real strength. Kovpak agreed to make the expedition, and set off late in October.[35] His passage across the Chernigov *oblast* was easy because of the strength of Fedorov's partisan forces there; on November 10 the mobile force crossed the Dnieper into the Reichskommissariat. The point at which the crossing was made was in the extreme north of Erich Koch's domain, above the confluence of the Pripet and the Dnieper,[36] in what had formed part of the Belorussian Soviet Republic. Throughout the first half of the winter, Kovpak was careful to keep within this extreme northern strip, which had the advantage of containing the most inaccessible terrain. His activities at this time could scarcely include showing the Soviet flag to a real Ukrainian population, though in late

[34] Borovets', "Dva khresty."

[35] Kovpak, pp. 78–82.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 85–87, and map at end of that volume. Apparently a considerable number of Red partisans were sent about the same time by air to the western area.

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November the group penetrated southern Polessia near Olevsk, the former headquarters of the Polis'ka Sich.[37] The greatest single victory of Kovpak's group in this period was the temporary capture of the *Kreisgebiet* capital, Lelchitsi, on November 26.[38] After that, German counterattacks became extremely heavy, and Kovpak's men appear to have spent a miserable two months evading the Germans in the frozen swamps along the middle course of the Pripet River.[39] In February, however, he headed south, cutting across a corner of "Bul'ba's" territory, then striking eastward through *Generalbezirk* Zhitomir.

While Red forces were pushing down from the northeast, the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement was beginning to acquire real significance, although the nationalists were compelled to give some ground in northeastern Volhynia to the stronger Red partisans.[40] The SS and the Wehrmacht were agreed on the necessity of harsh measures to combat the Communist partisan threat. From the beginning, even those Wehrmacht generals who generally took a reasonable attitude toward the peoples of the east advocated the harshest measures toward partisans. For example, Field-Marshal von Reichenau based his policy on the concept that the Germans must be more feared than the partisans; he ordered that all who did not aid the fight against the latter be regarded as enemies, and that men who did not hinder or report partisan activities be "draconically" treated.[41] This policy was

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 85; this corresponds with reports of a shift of Red partisan activity to the Stolin-Sarny-Olevsk triangle in PS 3943, February 12, 1942.

[38] Reichskommissar Ukraine to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, December 10, 1942, CXLV 488, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLV 488).

[39] Report of Höherer SS und Polizeiführer Russland-Süd, Ukraine, und Nordost, December 26, 1942, NO 1128 (hereafter referred to as NO 1128); PS 3943, February 12, 1943. According to one of the leaders of the Soviet partisans in Belorussia, Kovpak established an airport on one of the frozen lakes of the region. With the help of the Soviet Belorussian partisans he was able to defend it until German bombing finally broke the ice (Lin'kov, p. 386).

[40] Cf. Lin'kov, p. 375.

[41] Directive Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, October 10, 1941, USSR Exhibit 12 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 12). See also a memorandum by Chef des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Field-Marshal Keitel, which stated that security troops in the rear areas would suffice only if they were allowed to proceed "draconically" without the requirement of juridical process, to convince the population that resistance would have terrible consequences (PS 459, July 23, 1941, hereafter referred to as PS 459).

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rigorously carried out in the fall of 1942.[43] The drastic reprisals carried out in western Volhynia and Polessia injured the patriotic Ukrainian peasantry as frequently as they did Communist sympathizers. Consequently, the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such suppression of their own compatriots, and especially in the brutal conscription for the *Ostarbeiter* program. The only alternative was desertion; in the fall thousands joined the forest refugees from burned villages and forced labor drives.[44] Unlike the latter, however, the police deserters were trained and frequently already organized by nationalists for opposition to the Germans. The command of the OUN-B in Galicia was reluctant to destroy its grip on the legal forces and risk a campaign of open resistance to the Germans at this time; but when they saw that the police units they dominated were breaking up anyway, and were in danger of passing over to the Communist guerrillas, they decided to begin a large-scale partisan movement. This step was taken in late November; by the early part of 1943 the activity of the Bandera groups was already considerable.[45]

There were two major centers of OUN-B activity. The first comprised the western part of the area which had been most ravaged by fighting between Red partisans and Germans, especially after Kovpak's passage to the southeast. Its extent may be defined by the quadrilateral formed by the towns of Kovel', Vladimirets (Volodimirets'), Kostopol', and Lutsk, although the chief operations were evidently carried out in the eastern section of this area.[46] A poor, woodland area, where the peasant popula-

[43] How drastic these measures could be in practice is shown by the reprisal burning of nine villages in the Petrikov area, leaving the peasants to shift for themselves in the dead of winter, although the *Gebietskommissar* himself asserted they were innocent of aiding the partisans (Occ E-4 [1]). The main "pacifying" campaign was carried out in Volhynia in September and early October, 1942 (NO 1128); cf. Lebed', p. 24, on the slaughter of nationalist adherents due to Communist provocation.

[44] Lebed', p. 26.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 24; the extent of German repression and Communist activity, which threatened to serve as an outlet for popular indignation, led the OUN-B to start operations before it really wished to do so (Interview 76).

[46] Lebed', pp. 24–25; PS 3943, March 19, 1943, ascribes (probably incorrectly, since the Germans were not fully informed of the nature of the nationalist bands) the attacks east of the Rovno-Lutsk road to a "Bul'bist" group. The western section of this area was partly controlled by large Polish police forces recruited to take the deserting Ukrainians' place. A savage struggle between them and the nationalists (especially the Bandera partisans), inflicting fearful hardships on the civilian population, was carried on all through 1943.

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tion, while not extremely nationalist, appears to have viewed the nationalists with favor after the brutalities inflicted by the Communists and Germans, it made an ideal base for the nationalist activity.

A second base was established in Volhynia proper, southwest of Rovno. The activities there, however, were much more circumscribed than those farther north, because the wooded areas were smaller and the possibility of counterattack by the Germans greater. The nucleus of the Bandera forces in this area appears to have been a group of about one hundred men under a leader whose pseudonym was "Kruk." Evidently a small police unit which had broken away from its German command, it was encamped in the forest near Kremenets. Living near it on amicable terms, was a group under the command of a Mel'nyk officer known as "Khrin." [46] Both groups were really underground rather than partisan bands; they carried on such activities as raids on German convoys, "jail deliveries," and attacks on small German detachments to secure arms. It appears that they endeavored to maintain an appearance of subordination to German orders, or at least lack of hostility, for their position was too exposed to permit the luxury of open warfare.[47] They were of some importance, however, because they were in a section where the peasantry was very sympathetic to the nationalist cause, and because they formed a natural link between the headquarters in Galicia and the zones of more intense activity farther north.

In addition to the OUN-B centers just described, and the Mel'nyk group under "Khrin," there were several other small groups scattered over the area southwest of a line extending from Rovno through Lutsk to Kovel'. Little bands of Mel'nyk supporters hid in the woods near Dubno, Lutsk, and Vladimir Volynsk (Volodymyr Volyns'k); a group of dissidents who had been members

[46] The most detailed account is in MS D, which gives the strength of "Khrin's" group (with which the author of the manuscript served) as 140 in the spring of 1943, 500 in early June, and 200 a month later when Kovpak arrived. Apparently "Kruk's" group was weaker until June, when it began to forge ahead.

[47] The nature of these groups is of course a highly controversial subject. Cf. especially O. Shuliak, *V im'ia pravdy: Do istorii povstanoho rukhu v Ukraïni* (In the Name of Truth: On the History of the Insurrectionary Movement in the Ukraine) (Rotterdam, 1947), p. 18; Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" (The Volhynian Battalion), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (March, 1951), p. 2; Vershigora, p. 400.

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of the OUN-B, known as the Front of Ukrainian Revolutionists (Front Ukraïns'kykh Revolutsionistsiv), was allied to them, while an *Otaman*, Voloshyn-Berchak, led a group of Free Cossacks in the Kremenets region.[48] By far the most important detachment, aside from the Bandera group, however, was that of Borovets', which had automatically (somewhat against the desires of its leader) swelled in numbers as the fugitives and police not affiliated with the Bandera forces sought a rallying point. Moreover, as the general confusion in Volhynia led the Mel'nyk OUN to take more open action, support from this quarter increased. One of the chief Mel'nyk leaders in Volhynia, Oleh Shtul', had for a long time been carrying on surreptitious resistance activities while ostensibly acting as an agent for a Ukrainian newspaper; now he permanently attached himself to the "Bul'ba" headquarters as representative of the OUN-M.[49] Moreover, young Iatseniuk, who had lived in Volhynia illegally for more than a year after his escape from Zhitomir, took the name "Volynets'" and formed a group operating southeast of Borovets', with a base a short distance inside the frontier east of Korets. It was the only nationalist partisan group based within the frontier of the pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine; as it was led by a man familiar with Soviet conditions who had wide connections in the Zhitomir area, it was useful for carrying out "propaganda raids" in the *Generalbezirk* Zhitomir.[50]

It was only natural that the dispersion and lack of unitary direction of the nationalist partisan forces aroused concern; the first proposal for a single command was evidently made by Borovets'. The Bandera forces sent negotiators to him. Both parties were agreed that some higher center was necessary, for the lack of such authority might lead to the degeneration of the nationalist partisan movement into mere banditry. "Bul'ba" wanted the creation of an all-party front comprising UNDP, UNR, OUN-M, and OUN-B. The Mel'nyk followers agreed to his proposals, no doubt feeling that they already had the "inside track" with the partisan commander. The Bandera group, on the other hand, in

[48] Shuliak, p. 25; MS D; Interview 60.
[49] Interview 12.
[50] *Ibid.*; Shuliak, p. 27.

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accord with the guiding principle of their movement, demanded political direction by their Provid, although in return they were willing to recognize Borovets' as over-all commander of military operations. They offered as ground for rejecting the proposal the obvious impracticability of associating the UNR, whose leadership in Warsaw could be reached only infrequently, in a political directorate which had to control so shifting a force as the partisans. Of equal importance—at least according to Borovets' and his supporters—was the latter's insistence on maintaining the "conspiratorial" nature of the movement, i.e., the use of a nucleus staff with most of the followers carrying on their normal activities. The Bandera group, on the other hand, unquestionably desired a large-scale movement of open resistance, which would have meant "deconspiration," the revelation of the identity of the adherents of the nationalist partisan movement. In May, when no agreement could be reached, the negotiations were broken off.[51]

This severance of contacts, however, had no immediately serious consequences, for shortly afterwards a dramatic change in the situation in the whole western area took place with the arrival of the major Red partisan force. After he turned away from former Polish Volhynia, Kovpak pushed across the northern parts of the Zhitomir and Kiev *Generalbezirke*. Although German attacks forced him to keep on the move, the whole area north of the Zhitomir-Kiev line was so infested by Red partisans that it never again came under effective German control.[52] By May, however, Kovpak's own band was back in the northern swamp area. Then came orders from Moscow for a still more extensive operation, a penetration of Galicia.

The shortest route for Kovpak's forces lay directly across western Polessia and Volhynia, passing slightly north of Rovno. At a point in the neighborhood of Liudvipol', in the heart of "Bul'ba's" territory, however, the Kovpak group turned sharply to the northeast, traversing the Tsuman' area, which was a section dominated by the Bandera group.[53] Having reached the

[51] Cf. Lebed', pp. 41–43; Shuliak, pp. 20 ff.; Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 12.
[52] PS 265.
[53] Kovpak, map; MS D.

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725 668 Tsuman' area, Kovpak turned south. His route from that point would have taken him directly through the Kremenets centers of the Mel'nyk and Bandera bands, but again he made a detour, this time to the east, skirting the Kremenets area and entering Galicia south of Ternopol' (Tarnopil').[54] The entire march across the area of operations of the nationalist partisans—over 250 miles—took the Red force about three weeks.[55]

725 669 When Kovpak's force entered Galicia in early July, it was only partially successful in achieving its primary objective, disruption of the Drohobich petroleum production.[56] It did, however, cause a severe disturbance of the peace of Galicia. For a long time the OUN-B had been preparing an underground armed force there. When Kovpak's arrival turned the extreme eastern part of the province into a battlefield, this organization (Ukraïns'ka Narodna Samooborona—Ukrainian Popular Self-Defense, a name chosen to conceal its identity with the Volhynian forces) came into the open to fight the Communists.[57] As they had long had numerous scores to settle with the occupation authorities, the young warriors also began sporadic fighting with the Germans.[58] What is most interesting as an indication of the state of feeling in Galicia, however, is the speed with which Kovpak's group melted away

[54] MS D; Kovpak, map. It will be noted that, although a distinct shift in route was made, the deviation was not very great—perhaps twenty miles. One source maintains that Kovpak sent emissaries to the groups at Kremenets to propose cooperation or at least neutrality, but that while they refused, the largest ("Khrin's") numbered only two hundred, and so was quite incapable of attacking Kovpak's more than two thousand men (MS D).

[55] While the force left its swamp headquarters on June 12, it evidently did not enter western Polessia until about the twentieth and was deep in Galicia by July 9 (Kovpak, p. 109, and map).

[56] According to Kovpak the aim was the destruction of the oil fields around Ternopol', the second largest petroleum production center under German control (Kovpak, p. 107). While this is plausible enough, Ukrainian sources have always claimed that the aim of the expedition was disruption of the tranquility of Galicia, and especially interference with recruitment of Galician youths for the German armed forces. Probably the latter purpose occupied at least a secondary place in the minds of the Soviet leaders, since they would scarcely be willing to admit that it was necessary to send a partisan group which had been founded five hundred miles away in order to prevent their former subjects in Galicia from joining the "Fascist" forces.

[57] Lebed', p. 49.

[58] *Ibid.*; Report of "Dr. Frédéric" to Auswärtiges Amt, September 19, 1943, CXLVa 60, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 60); cf. Chapter VII, n. 25.

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in the unfavorable environment. When the raid on the oil fields failed, the group headed for the Carpathians. It is apparent even from Kovpak's own account that the powerful force disintegrated within a few weeks of its arrival there. In the latter part of August, Kovpak himself, with part of the band, headed north, reaching the swamp region on September 1 with about three hundred men. His second in command remained behind and was killed, apparently with the majority of the band.[59] Since the Carpathians contain at least as favorable terrain for guerrilla operations as does the Polessian area, where Kovpak's group maintained itself and even grew during months of heavy German attacks, it appears that a decisive factor in the rapid destruction of the band was the hostile attitude of the Galician population.

Kovpak's force had scarcely left Volhynia before the Bandera partisans began to seize control of the nationalist resistance movement. The failure of negotiations with Borovets' induced their commander, Dmytro Kliachkevs'kyi, to adopt the title UPA in an apparent effort to secure the prestige attached to it by "Bul'ba's" earlier start.[60] At the same time, the Bandera partisans regained the services of the most experienced of their commanders, Roman Shukevych, who had been the chief Ukrainian organizer in "Nachtigall." After the dissolution of Stets'ko's government, this unit had been withdrawn from the front, together with "Roland." Both detachments were thoroughly reorganized, certain nationalist members were arrested and the remainder sent as a detachment to fight Red partisans in White Russia.[61] When it appeared likely that the Germans would also suppress this anti-partisan unit, Shukevych escaped to Galicia, arriving in L'vov in the spring of 1943. There the Provid appointed him commander of all OUN-B partisan forces.[62] Moreover, the leaders decided that the refusal of Borovets' and the Mel'nyk forces to accept their proposals for union required forceful action to see that the nationalist partisan struggle did not degenerate into the private

[59] Kovpak, p. 124.
[60] See Chapter IV, n. 79.
[61] Liubomyr Ortyns'kyi, "Druzhyny Ukraïns'kykh Natsionalistiv (DUN)" (The Brotherhoods of Ukrainian Nationalists [DUN]), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (June-July, 1952), p. 6; Lebed', p. 22.
[62] Interview 76.

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725 enterprises of numerous *otamans* or war lords, as had the Ukrainian movement in the last days of Petliura's regime.[63]

Consequently, on July 6, shortly after Kovpak had passed through the area, "Kruk's" force suddenly appeared fully armed before the Mel'nyk detachment of "Khrin" and demanded that it submit to Bandera command. Lack of preparation made resistance impossible; apparently, too, OUN-B propaganda had prepared the ground for the coup. At any rate, the majority of the Mel'nyk group accepted the ultimatum and enrolled in the Bandera force.[64]

Shortly afterwards, Iatseniuk's group was similarly compelled to join the rival forces.[65] After these incidents, the remaining Mel'nyk and independent groups rapidly melted away; they were destroyed by Communists or Bandera partisans, or joined the latter. In mid-August, "Bul'ba's" main force, which had also been seriously weakened, in part because of continued fights with Red partisans, was attacked by an OUN-B group. Two of his principal advisers from the UNR were captured and forced to join the OUN-B group; his wife was also taken prisoner.[66] He himself, together with Shtul', Mitrynga, Raievs'kyi, and other leaders, but with only a handful of fighting men, was driven eastward into Communist-infested territory. Here in November the group encountered a stronger Red force. In the resulting fight, Mitrynga and Raievs'kyi were killed, but Borovets' and Shtul' again managed to escape.[67] This time they took the only course which they felt remained open: they left Volhynia altogether, going to Warsaw to seek German assistance to rebuild their scattered forces.[68] Shcherbatiuk remained as commander of the tiny, demoralized group in Volhynia (which had been renamed the Ukraïns'ka Narodna Revoliutsiina Armiia—Ukrainian People's

[63] Lebed', pp. 41–43.

[64] Shuliak, p. 25; MS D; I. Hirniak, "Tse bulo 6. lypnia 1943. roku" (This was July 6, 1943), *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), July 1, 1951, p. 3. All three sources assert that numerous Mel'nyk adherents were executed by the OUN-B.

[65] Shuliak, p. 27.

[66] *Ibid.*; Hrytsenko in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 14, 1951, p. 4.

[67] Interviews 50, 72.

[68] Lebed', pp. 41–43, confirms the general nature of these attacks on the "Bul'bist" groups, although he emphasizes their lack of organization and the "bloodless" nature of the OUN-B compulsion.

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Revolutionary Army—UNRA, to distinguish it from the Bandera usurpers of the original title).[69]

The rapid loss of strength of the Mel'nyk-Borovets' forces presents something of a puzzle. The explanation offered by the representatives of the latter is that they deliberately decided to refrain from entering into a fratricidal struggle. In part this appears to be correct. A major objective of both Borovets' and the Mel'nyk chiefs was to avoid creating a large-scale partisan organization, yet this is what would have been necessary to counter the Bandera group, which was bent on forming just such a powerful force. On the other hand, the assertion of adherents of the defeated party that the first attacks came unexpectedly, yet resulted in a complete surrender, itself implies that it was not calculated avoidance of an internecine struggle which alone led to the defeat. While the Bandera adherents were tightly organized, capable of sudden, prepared action, the other nationalist forces suffered from lack of central organization and competent leadership, since Borovets' was himself inadequately trained to conduct a campaign which required political as well as military experience and yet was unable to secure advice from a single, unified advisory body. Moreover, the very dynamism and *élan* of the Bandera party appear to have attracted popular support; in spite of the comparative lack of military ability of "Kruk," for example, he is said to have been more popular than "Khrin." No doubt, too, their program of mass uprising, while of doubtful wisdom, was, like all forthright action, appealing to active spirits. It is noteworthy that nearly all of the members of the other partisan groups, when compelled to join the OUN-B movement, did so without taking a favorable opportunity to desert. Ukrainians in general have frequently been in the unhappy position of having to choose the lesser evil, which was unquestionably the Bandera movement, ruthless as many of its adherents were. The main concern was to fight on against the alien occupiers.[70] A third factor was the geographical location of the opposing forces. The group under Borovets' occupied excellent terrain, but an

[69] Borovets', *Zboroina borot'ba*, p. 12.

[70] This feeling was expressed in a letter from Iatseniuk to Borovets' explaining that he accepted the OUN-B coercion only so that he could continue to fight against the Soviet and German forces (Interview 50).

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669 725 extremely exposed position, subjected to constant pressure by the Red partisans coming down from the northeast. Probably "Bul'ba" suffered as much altogether from attacks from them as he did at the hands of the Bandera partisans. The latter, on the other hand, occupied a somewhat more sheltered position in northern Volhynia and had a fairly clear line of communication to their large base in Galicia. Finally, the possession of the Galician source of manpower and leadership, very much larger than any outside source available to the rival groups, gave the OUN-B a decisive advantage, which had been consolidated by the early infiltration of the Volhynian police forces by Bandera organizers.

By fall of 1943 the Bandera group was in substantial control of the country districts of Volhynia and southwestern Polessia.[71] The Germans, of course, held the towns and with difficulty maintained movement on the principal roads, but it was even possible for OUN-B agents to penetrate the Reichskommissariat capital, Rovno, and to kill several of Koch's principal officials in broad daylight.[72] Such a large area east of Rovno was under full control of the insurgents that they set about constructing a "state" apparatus, including military training camps, hospitals, and a school system.[73] The total number of persons involved in the movement —including medical, administrative, and instructional personnel, as well as fighting men—was tens of thousands. Looked at in this fashion, the nationalist claim of a hundred thousand members of the UPA is perhaps not incredible, since a fairly trustworthy source describes one village in which the total personnel reached two thousand. Probably a German estimate of forty thousand (at the end of 1943) is more nearly accurate, however.[74] Included in the forces, according to nationalist accounts, were a number of non-Ukrainian elements—Jewish physicians and deserters from German police units recruited from prisoners of war representing many of the nations of the Soviet Union. The great weakness of the movement, however, was lack of trained officers. For a long time the Bandera partisans had been forced to use as chief of staff an elderly UNR officer ostensibly in command of a Rovno

[71] Occ E-4 (1).
[72] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, November 23, 1943, p. 3; Occ E-4 (1).
[73] Lebed', pp. 29–30.
[74] Occ E-4 (1).

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police regiment.[75] Each additional UNR officer from the "Bul'ba" forces, aging though he was, was a treasure who was given a post of great importance by his new masters.[76] Similarly, Soviet officers who escaped from prisoner camps or deserted from Red forces were eagerly welcomed. The lack of trained military personnel greatly limited the partisan organization's value as a fighting force.

The presence of many men who had lived under the Soviet system at first acted as a disturbing influence in the organization. The Bandera leadership, having carried the policy of one-party direction to a temporarily successful conclusion, was determined to maintain this position and to prevent the development of an East Ukrainian opposition, which they suspected was infected with Communist attitudes. Their instrument was the SB or Security Service, forged by Lebed' years previously. Though the extent of the "purges" of "unreliable elements" (primarily East Ukrainians, but including some former Mel'nyk partisans, although apparently no old UNR émigrés) is uncertain, there is little question that it was sufficiently great to arouse extreme disaffection among the non-OUN-B elements in the enlarged partisan movement.[77] At the same time, however, the East Ukrainian elements apparently had sufficient influence—or compelling arguments—to secure the adoption of a program calculated to secure support from former Soviet citizens.[78]

At the Third Extraordinary Great Congress of the OUN partisan forces on August 21–25, 1943, both Germany and the "Muscovite" Soviet Union were criticized as not really socialist or progressive, while a future national and social revolution or subjugated peoples was prophesied.[79] Greatest emphasis was still placed on armed struggle, rather than on social policy; but a long series of measures evidently calculated to broaden support among the East Ukrainians was proposed. They included destruction of

[75] MS D.

[76] E.g., Colonel Treiko and Colonel Lytvynenko, chief adviser from Andrew Livyts'kyi to Borovets'; MS D.

[77] Shuliak, p. 30; MS D.

[78] See report of a press conference of the UHVR by M. Stiranka in *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, October 11, 1947, p. 3.

[79] *Za samostiinu Ukrainu: Boiovyi organ OUN* (For Ukrainian Independence: The Military Organ of the OUN) (clandestine), No. 9, December 10, 1943.

668* It seems quite clear that a great many, at least of the leaders of the UHVR, like the leaders of the OUN in the East Ukraine many months earlier, were only partly convinced of the value of the new program of political, social, and economic gains. They had, however, come to see that vast numbers of East Ukrainians, by this time heavily represented in the partisan movement, would accept no ideology which failed to embrace such a program. Consequently, nationalist leaders were determined to win popular support for nationalism by presenting it as the surest road to political liberty and social welfare. Regardless of the motivations of the West Ukrainian leaders, however, it is clear that by 1944 contact with East Ukrainians had resulted in a sweeping change in the ideological position of the dominant nationalist group.

[725] From the strictly military viewpoint, the activities of the Ukrainian nationalist partisans were of slight significance. Even from the immediate political standpoint, it is questionable whether they achieved anything of importance, for by the time the Germans were inclined to make concessions, their authority was already on the verge of being overthrown by the Red Army. The "deconspiration" of the UPA undoubtedly inflicted considerable suffering upon the people of Volhynia, since it exposed the nationalist elements to the Soviet authorities. On the other side of the ledger must be placed the facts that the nationalist partisan movement undoubtedly prevented the spread of Red partisans to Volhynia and demonstrated that neither in that province nor in Galicia was there widespread sympathy for the Soviet guerrilla groups. Moreover, the fact that the Ukrainians, almost alone among east European nations, were able to carry on an armed struggle, even to a limited extent and for a comparatively short time, against both the German and the Soviet forces was an important psychological stimulus to nationalist feeling.

563 unity to move into the towns or to emigrate the Ukrainian peasants were pauperised.

These conditions were favourable to the growing of extremist trends in Ukrainian political life: communism on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

668 The policy of 'Ukrainisation' in Eastern Ukraine was exploited
661 by Communist propaganda: the 'Ukrainisation' in Soviet Ukraine,
563 adversited by Moscow, did not remain without influence on the population of the Western Ukrainian territories. The Communists of Western Ukraine served Soviet Russia as a 'fifth column' among the Ukrainians in Poland.

The Polonisation of Ukrainian schools, the colonisation of Ukrainian territory with Poles, the refusal to admit Ukrainians to Government service, the persecutions of the Ukrainian press, of educational and economic organisations — all this gave the basis for the creation of illegal Ukrainian groups which began the fight
● [725] against the Polish régime with terror. In 1920 the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) was created in Galicia and organised attacks on the representatives of the Polish Government. Later UVO fused with the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded at a Congress in Vienna in 1929 under the leadership of Colonel Evhen Konovalets. The Polish Government took advantage of the terrorist acts and sabotage attributed to the members of OUN to destroy the Ukrainian cultural and economic life. In September 1930, Polish troops and police undertook a terrible 'pacification' among the Ukrainian population in towns and villages. Polish soldiers and policemen severely beat more than 15,000 Ukrainians, mostly cultural and economic workers, who had not anything in common with the terrorist activity and often were resolute opponents of terror. Many victims of this 'pacification' died after terrible sufferings. A great number of Ukrainian economic and educational institutions — co-operative societies, schools, reading halls and libraries were destroyed.

After the 'pacification', the oppressions against the Ukrainians in Poland grew worse and the Polish colonisation of Ukrainian territories was increased by state funds. In September 1934, the delegates of the Polish Government declared at the Session of the League of Nations that Poland did not have any obligations towards the resolutions of the peace treaties regarding the protection of the rights of the national minorities in Poland.

By this action the Polish Government violated even formally the obligations accepted by Poland in the Peace Treaties in regard to the national minorities.

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. Ukraine after the War

727 000 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

162 cent. of the total, as compared with 32.8 per cent. for the entire Soviet Union. Next to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukraine has a higher percentage of urban population than any other Union Republic.

The German-Soviet War

726 On June 22, 1941, the German armies, supported by their satellites, including the Rumanians and the Hungarians, attacked the Soviet Union on a 1,500 mile front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Nearly six weeks later the Germans started their main thrust against Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on September 21, after a fierce struggle, the Soviet troops evacuated the city. It was another two months before the Germans reached Kharkov and Rostov.

727 [725] For the second time in this century the Ukraine was subjected to occupation and devastation by the Germans. However, the Soviet policy of scorching the earth in retreat had aggravated normal military destruction; and in addition, the Ukrainians conducted heroic guerilla warfare against the enemy occupation forces. As a result, the Germans found the fruits of conquest "rather disappointing"[1] For example, in the Ukraine it was possible in the autumn of 1941 to carry out only a small fraction of the average sowing. In the western part of the Ukraine, very few industrial plants remained intact; the Nikolayev naval yards, the Dnieper dam and power station, and the metallurgical plants of the Dniepropetrovsk district were all either crippled or destroyed.

726 The German occupation of the Ukraine lasted nearly three and a half years. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 was the turning point of the war and the beginning of the big Soviet offensives.

In the winter campaign of 1943-44 the Soviet troops won important victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, completed the liberation of the Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie and Zhitomir regions and almost the whole of the Rovno and Kirovograd regions, as well as of a number of districts in other areas.[2] In April and May 1944 they liberated Odessa, and in August, Western Ukraine. The liberation of the whole Ukraine was completed by November 1944.

727 The years of hard fighting took a very heavy toll all along the western front of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sustained enormous losses.

War Losses of Population

At the Kiev trial of German war criminals in January 1946 it was disclosed that more than four million Soviet citizens had been murdered

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1 The Russian Campaigns of 1941-43, W.E.D.Allen and Paul Muratoff, Penguin Books, London, 1944.

2 Soviet War News, London, February 24, 1944.